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Abstract
I consider schemes that gear service on concessional debt to changes
in countries’ real GDP growth. The schemes operate by accelerating and
retarding concessional debt repayments. In the case of lower than ex-
pected economic growth, borrowing countries will be exempt, partially or
fully, from the debt service due. In periods with higher growth, total debt
service to the lender will increase. However, as we do not want a poor
country to be punished in the form of taxation for achieving economic
growth, it would only repay the original sum of debt service due. The
difference is paid to the lender by a New Trust Fund, similar to the HIPC
Trust Fund. I analyze the effectiveness of the schemes using historic sim-
ulations of debt service to IDA, the concessional window of the World
Bank, for a set of seven highly indebted African countries. Results show
that modifications of this sort appear feasible and increase the flexibility
of low income primary producing countries without significant disruptions
to the lender finances. The variability of the free foreign exchange relative
to the country’s GDP is reduced by an average of 3.7%. Because of the
significant offsetting between periods of positive and negative economic
growth the simulated flows to the lender average roughly 95% of the ac-
tual historical flows. The cost to the New Trust Fund over a period of 18
years is less than the IDA assistance provided through the HIPC Trust
Fund to these countries over the past 5 years.
1 Introduction
Low-income countries debt is again at the forefront of the policy agenda. After
a decade of attempts to relieve these countries of their unsustainable debt bur-
dens and in spite of the debt reduction delivered under the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, many countries that had profited from the
HIPC Initiative have experienced rising debt burdens again and other poor coun-
tries have seen their debt situation worsen. All this has resulted in low-income
countries facing significant challenges in meeting their development objectives,
including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
These developments have spurred the interest of academia and the inter-
national community in the search for possible solutions. Renewed prominence
has been given to the possible need for innovation of the design of the coun-
tries’ financial liabilities [Declaration of Nuevo Leon, 2004; Declaration of the
Zambian president, 2004] not only as a means of mitigation of the impact of
economic shocks, but also as a way to exploit risk sharing opportunities (IMF,
2004; Shiller, 2003 and 2004; Dreze, 2000; Berlage et al, 2000 and 2002). Most
recently a more radical proposal has been discussed by the International Fi-
nancial Institutions (IFIs): linking debt repayments to the country’s economic
performance, measured in terms of growth of its gross domestic product (GDP).
The idea of indexing sovereign debt to a country’s GDP is not new. Specific
proposals have been discussed since the 1980s [Krugman, 1988; Froot, Scharf-
stein and Stein, 1989; Kletzer, 1992; Shiller, 1993, 2003; Barro, 1995; Dreze,
2000] and a handful of countries, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Costa
Rica, have already issued bonds containing an element of indexation to GDP.
Most recently, however, the attention of the international financial community
has focused anew on bonds indexed to GDP. The attention has been sparked by
the serious intention of the Argentine authorities to include a GDP option in
the country’s debt restructuring scheme (Presentation by Argentina at the 2003
Dubai IMF Meetings; US SEC, 2004); and the attempts of the international
financial institutions, in particular the IMF, to promote the GDP framework
not only for emerging markets but also for developed economies (Borensztein
and Mauro, 2004; IMF, 2004).
While recent research has made a strong case for indexing debt to GDP in
emerging markets, an interesting question to be answered is whether this ap-
proach would be applicable and desirable for low income countries, and in partic-
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ular member countries of the International Development Association (IDA), the
concessional window of the World Bank. IDA members are the poorest coun-
tries in the world, and for these countries concessional loans are the main source
of financing. The risk of debt distress in these countries primarily increases not
due to an increase in the debt burden itself, but due to a deterioration in their
capacity to pay. While debt levels in low income countries are fairly stable, these
countries experience high volatility in exports and GDP (Easterly 2003). The
volatility is partly due to exogenous shocks that cause liquidity problems and
require adequate adjustment of their debt service pattern (World Bank 2004).
The idea of real indexation of IDA lending is new. Two instruments have
been considered so far: commodity prices indexation (Gilbert and Tabova, 2003,
and 2004) and inflation indexed local currency denominated lending (Hausmann
and Rigobon, 2003a). Limited potential benefits for the borrowing countries
under the former instrument and concerns about adverse selection and moral
hazard in the latter inspire the exploration of other options, and in particular
GDP as a measure for indexation of IDA lending. In this paper I examine the
feasibility and desirability of linking IDA debt repayments to the countries’ real
GDP growth. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the
rationale for GDP indexation. Section 3 discusses the idea of GDP linked debt
in the case of emerging markets. Section 4 analyzes its feasibility for IDA and
presents the general structure of the schemes. In section 4 I outline the finan-
cial structure of the schemes. Section 5 presents the simulation methodology
and results from both the borrower’s and lender’s perspective. Section 6 con-
cludes. A detailed description of existing GDP-linked arrangements is presented
in Appendix.
2 Rationale for GDP indexation and
international risk-sharing
Growth-indexed debt is seen as a sensible way to provide insurance for a coun-
try and to facilitate international risk-sharing. While new instruments have the
potential to complement the existing practice, in reality, due mainly to “incom-
plete markets” (see for example Magill, 1996; Kehoe, 2000), the advantages of
this have not always been fully utilized. In international macroeconomics a large
literature has developed evaluating the gains from risk-sharing among countries.
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Baxter and Jehrman (1997) note that individual portfolios implement very lit-
tle international diversification. Dreze (2000) notes that globalization of risk
bearing is far from realized and securitization, through innovative financing in-
struments, can offer prospects for improvement. In this light, bonds indexed to
national income can offer “unquestionable prospects for improved risk-sharing.”
The less developed countries are the ones that suffer the most from the in-
adequate international risk pooling and sharing. They usually have a liability
structure that is associated with high volatility. These countries are also most
prone to exogenous shocks and as such should benefit from insurance provided by
the rich countries. However, there are currently no well-developed institutions
whereby a less developed country can buy insurance against its macroeconomic
risks. Each country is expected to bear its own risks alone and is heavily penal-
ized when the risks materialize, as happened in the 1980s when the appreciation
of the dollar and increased interest rates made their debt levels unsustainable
(Dreze 2000; Berlage et al., 2000 and 2002).
When internal economic conditions are difficult, in terms of growth slow-
downs, these countries are more likely to experience difficulties servicing their
debt, which is currently not contingent on their economic growth. The govern-
ments then have three options, all leading to excessive disruption to economic
activity:
• they can choose to default on their obligations, which usually has a trau-
matic effect for a very long period of time for the economy as a whole and
is accompanied by combined seize of new financing; or
• renegotiate and seek restructuring, which in principle would have the same
consequences as in the case of default, although slightly milder; or
• engage in procyclical policy by tightening their fiscal policies, imposing
substantial economic and social cost.
By making payments contingent on the ability to repay, governments would
less often experience difficulties in meeting the debt obligations and hence, would
avoid having to make a choice between these three options. Indexation of debt
to macroeconomic variables has been considered by Merton (1983) and Barro
(1995): consumption-linked national debt; Bailey (1983) advocated conversion
of defaulted debt into a share of exports; Krugman (1988) and Froot, Scharfstein
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and Stein (1989) compared a potential indexation to commodity prices and
GDP and emphasized the moral hazards associated with the latter. Shiller
(1993, 2000, 2004) and Dreze (2000) have been the biggest advocates of GDP
indexation arguing that issuance of instruments whose pay-outs are linked to
GDP “could do a great deal to reduce country risk, and promote welfare” and
have made specific proposals, presented in more detail below.
3 GDP-linked debt for emerging markets
3.1 Specific proposals to date
3.1.1 Shiller’s proposal
Shiller (1993) has proposed the creation of a system of markets, “macro mar-
kets”, for long-term claims on a wide array of income flows, including GDP,
that would provide opportunities for comprehensive risk management. Issuance
of instruments whose pay-outs are linked to GDP, or to other indicators of that
GDP, of a country, could reduce country risk, and promote welfare (see Athana-
soulis, Shiller, and van Wincoop, 1999; and Shiller 2004). However, it has been
difficult to get such markets started, because they require “radical financial
innovation” with institutional change.
3.1.2 Dreze’s proposal
A specific proposal for restructuring low income countries debt was formulated
by Berlage, Cassimon, Dreze and Reding (2000). The authors suggest restruc-
turing of the debt of poor countries in the form of bonds indexed on the coun-
try’s national income net of a deductible. The link to national income has a
co-insurance feature: if the country does well, it will reimburse more than re-
quired; if it does poorly, it will reimburse less, but still extinguish its obligation.
The indexed bonds are comparable to shares of equity in the country’s national
income. Each year a “sustainable debt service” (SDS) is paid that is only con-
tingent on the country’s economic performance, thus making it independent of
the initial scheduled payments. The sustainable debt service is defined as a suit-
able fraction of an adjusted national income (Berlage et al., 2000, and 2002).
The proposal is similar to the perpetual claims on a country’s GDP, proposed
by Shiller.
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3.1.3 IMF’s advocacy for GDP-linked bonds
Recent publications (Borensztein and Mauro 2004, IMF 2004) have advocated
the adoption of GDP-indexed government bonds for emerging markets. The pro-
posed instrument is a combination of a floating rate plain vanilla bond and an
insurance contract with payment contingent on realization of real GDP growth.
The coupon rate varies according to the performance of the domestic economy.
The instrument is seen as an “automatic stabilizer” type mechanism that would
reduce the likelihood of crises and the need for procyclical policies by keeping
the debt-to-GDP ratio within a narrow range. Simulation results show con-
siderable benefits to the borrowing countries. The potential obstacles to the
successful implementation of such a financial innovation arise from the fact that
debt repayments are indexed to a variable that is within the control of the gov-
ernment. This can create lower incentives for growth-promoting policies and
and can lead to misreporting of statistics (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004; IMF,
2004). However, the extent to which governments would pursue less growth-
oriented policies and would be tempted to misreport official statistics remains
an open question.
3.2 The experience with GDP-linked debt
A handful of countries, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Costa Rica, have
already issued bonds containing an element of indexation to GDP. The bonds
were issued as part of Brady restructuring agreements and contain clauses that
increase the payoff to bondholders if GDP of the debtor country rises above a
certain level. Argentina is currently considering GDP indexation for its post-
crisis debt restructuring. These are all examples of restructuring of external
debt obligations. There are, however, instances of domestic sovereign debt or
corporate debt indexed to GDP. A detailed description of the existing GDP-
linked arrangements is given in Appendix B.
As GDP-linked debt has many of the characteristics of equity, it offers, in
theory, advantages to both the issuer and the bondholder. The issuer makes
additional payments only when conditions are good and it can afford the ad-
ditional payments. The additional payments can be in the form of coupon
premium, in the case when interest payments are contingent on the economic
performance or additional dividend when the principal is linked to GDP. This
allows for a better alignment of debt service and the country’s ability to pay,
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freeing resources and capacity for growth. Investors, on the other hand, can fully
profit from the country’s growth through the increased additional payments or
declining discount rates on the bonds. In reality, however, the advantages to
the investors depend on the incentives of the issuers to grow and the design of
the instruments. GDP-linked debt is a good investment whenever the issuer’s
benefits of higher growth outweigh the cost of higher debt service. Bulgaria,
for example, as an emerging market economy a step away from an investment
credit rating and accession to the EU, has had the incentives not only to grow,
but to achieve sustainable growth. The sustainable growth has made it possi-
ble to accumulate the resources not only to finance a higher debt service but
also to buy-back a substantial portion of its outstanding debt and refinance it
with cheaper resources. The bonds were callable and the indexation clause was
set too far out-of-the-money, leading to a buy-back operation before the clause
could be triggered.
Despite the obvious potential benefits, GDP-indexed bonds have not gained
popularity and have had only limited success. Three main explanations come to
mind. First, these arrangements are likely to send the wrong signals to investors,
as governments will most surely issue this kind of bonds in times of economic
slowdown. Further, the issuer is likely to call the bonds when the economy is
performing well with rising prospects for sustainable growth, which eventually
increase investors’ confidence and lower the interest rates, allowing the govern-
ment to borrow cheaper by issuing plain vanilla bonds. This was evidenced in
the case of Bulgaria. Second, experience so far has shown that it is difficult to
accurately price these bonds. The Bosnian warrants have been quoted as be-
ing extremely complicated, increasing the difficulty in pricing them, making the
instruments less attractive to investors. Third, the existing arrangements may
have been poorly designed. From all this, it can be derived that the success of
such an instrument, in terms of encouraging investors to buy them, will depend
on design features: (i) the design of the callability option; (ii) the determination
of the trigger is crucial, so they are not set too far out-of-the-money, as was the
case with the Bulgarian bonds.
Whether and how it might be possible to send the right signals, or at least to
avoid a negative connotation for investors, remain open questions. In all three
cases so far, and Argentina is likely to follow, the bonds were issued as part of
a debt restructuring agreement in period of debt distress and economic difficul-
ties. For the investors this presented a good solution to a problem: they could
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exchange defaulted debt or debt which is likely to default for a new sovereign
bond that had many of the characteristics of equity. If indexed debt is issued
not as part of a restructuring but as a normal financing operation, it might not
be such good signal to investors, as now they would not have to choose between
two bad options.
3.3 Emerging markets vs. IDA borrowers
Recent research on GDP indexation has examined emerging markets only. Be-
fore exploring the potentials of such indexation for the poorest countries in
the world, it is worth outlining the major differences between the two types of
countries that can affect the design of the proposal for IDA debt indexation as
compared to the proposal for the emerging markets.
Emerging markets, through their direct exposure to the international finan-
cial markets, are in a better position than IDA borrowers to make decisions
about their liability structure and have more alternatives to easing their debt
repayments or coping with exogenous shocks. IDA countries’ potential for man-
aging the maturity structure and currency composition of their debt is limited.
A high proportion of their external debt consists of concessional borrowing from
the official sector, with interest rates set at levels substantially lower than those
of the market and with long maturities not normally accessible in the market.
Also, these countries often do not have a choice with respect to the currency
terms, which are set in the currency of the lender or in SDR in the case of IDA,
exposing the borrower to substantial foreign exchange risk (Eichengreen et al,
1999; Hausmann et al, 2003b and 2003c). Because of lack of resources, expertise
or experience IDA borrowers do not use the opportunities the market presents
in terms of hedging instruments, or do so very little: weather derivatives, oil
derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, and credit derivatives. However, an
open question remains whether the markets can absorb the exposure of these
countries. The size of the position of these countries can be too large in relation
to the size of the market. Hence, while in theory these countries can profit
from the insurance instruments that the markets offer, the practice can be quite
different.
Debt composition and lenders incentives differ substantially in emerging mar-
kets and IDA borrowing countries. For the latter, multilateral and bilateral offi-
cial creditors have been the primary source of financing for the past two decades.
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Emerging markets debt, on the other hand, is largely from private commercial
sources. While the emerging market economies experience large negative net
transfers during crisis, the low income countries have consistently had positive
and substantial net resource transfers. The official creditors have had a long-
standing commitment to ensuring positive net transfers to the HIPCs, despite
the latter’s generally low productivity growth, high debt-service levels, and, in
some cases, virtual insolvency (World Bank, 1994). With prolonged economic
decline, especially in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, additional flows of
credit would not have been justifiable under commercial financing practices. The
official creditors, however, do not operate under commercial principles. Often
driven by political concerns and domestic commercial considerations, they even-
tually commit to maintaining positive net transfers. The positive net transfers
have been maintained using various mechanisms: initially through rescheduled
debt payments, then by substituting concessional loans and grants for noncon-
cessional loans (OED, 2003).
These differences have important implications in terms of desirability, de-
sign and potential success of a GDP-indexed instrument. The recent research of
GDP-indexed debt in emerging markets recognizes that its successful introduc-
tion depends on overcoming a number of obstacles, such as (i) complexity and
difficulties in pricing; and (ii) inability to call the bonds. In the case of conces-
sional loans indexation, however, these obstacles would not exist due mainly to
the differences in financing outlined above. Further, the IMF recognizes that it
is hard for any one country to offer a new product on its own and one suggestion
is that there should be an international effort, coordinated by the IFIs (IMF,
2004). Here, of course, as part of the international effort, the World Bank,
through IDA, can help develop the markets or set the standards by introducing
this arrangement in own house for its low income member countries.
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4 GDP-indexed concessional lending
4.1 Objectives and scope
The broad objective is to ease concessional debt repayments. More precisely,
the objective can be specified as:
• reduction in the variability of country’s debt-to-GDP ratios; or
• reduction in the variability of the foreign exchange resources that a country
has available after meeting debt obligations relative to its GDP.
Here I consider only IDA lending. IDA does not only help the poorest
countries reduce poverty by providing interest-free loans and grants for programs
aimed at boosting economic growth and improving living conditions, it also
coordinates donor assistance to provide relief for poor countries that cannot
manage their debt-service burden. If the new instrument is found to be feasible
and effective, it can eventually be copied by other MDBs, making most (if not
all) concessional debt service contingent on a country’s economic performance.
4.2 Indexation measure
A fundamental issue is the choice of measurement for the indexation that should
be determined by the objectives we pursue. Here I study the ability of GDP
indexation to successfully insure poor countries against the variety of shocks
they are usually exposed to. Further, the GDP is considered the broadest
measure of a country’s economy, and it represents the total market value of
all goods and services produced in a country during a given year. The debt-to-
GDP ratio is the “classic” debt burden indicator in the conventional literature
on debt dynamics (World Bank and IMF, 2001; and Edwards, 2001 and 2003)
Having GDP as denominator makes this ratio responsive to changes in the
overall economic performance (IDA, 2004).
4.3 General schemes
Currently, the scheduled concessional debt repayments are fixed. If IDA offers
the option of GDP indexation to its borrowers, a country’s yearly debt service
payment will depend on its economic growth relative to a benchmark.
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The scheme would operate by advancing and postponing debt service pay-
ments to IDA:
• In the case of lower than expected economic growth, borrowing countries
will be exempt, partially or fully, from the debt service due for the par-
ticular period. Here, IDA runs a downside risk, i.e. it will receive reduced
credit reflows, which will weaken its capacity to provide assistance in the
future (IDA, 2004).
• When GDP growth turns out higher than usual, total debt service to IDA
will increase. Because we do not want a poor country to be punished in
the form of taxation for achieving economic growth, it would only repay
the original sum of debt service due. The difference will be paid to IDA
by a trust fund that I call here the New Trust Fund. This approach would
also help cope with the risk of adverse selection and the potential lower
incentives for growth promoting policies in the IDA borrowing countries.
Moral hazard and adverse selection present some of the main potential prob-
lems in such a repayment arrangement. While moral hazard relates to the
countries’ incentives and policies, adverse selection relates to the choice of these
countries to participate in the new arrangement. The latter presents a serious
potential risk: as adoption of the proposal by IDA borrowers is voluntary, the
consequences for IDA in terms of risk diversification and offsetting of exposure
would depend on the set of countries that would actually participate in the
scheme. This is because the IDA borrowing countries that will opt for this form
of debt are those where growth prospects are least secure and specifically, where
governments have the informational advantage over the market in realizing that
the expectations reflected in the debt contract are insecure. The New Trust
Fund would ensure that countries that achieve economic growth would not be
punished with higher repayments and reduce their incentives for conventional
loans preferences.
While recognizing the seriousness of this problem, the simulations of the
proposed arrangement and assessment of the impact on IDA do not pursue to
deal with it, as the simulations are conducted for seven IDA borrowing countries,
and a full assessment of the impact on IDA and adverse selection simulation
would require a simulation of the impact for all 80 countries that are currently
in the IDA envelope.
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4.4 Role of the New Trust Fund
Donors would compensate IDA for foregone reflows due to higher than an-
ticipated growth in borrowing countries through additional contributions, for
example through a Trust Fund, similar to the HIPC Trust Fund. If these con-
tributions are provided in the form of upfront financing commitments it would
help reduce IDA risks.
The donors, through the New Trust Fund, would run an upside risk, i.e.
they will have to compensate IDA for the foregone value of extra repayments,
in the event a country grows. The donors would be in a quite different po-
sition than they are under the current arrangements, in which they would be
rewarding success in poor countries, contributing in a more straightforward way
to the achievement of development goals in the world’s poorest countries. On
the other hand, however, given the uncertainty of the economic growth path
of these countries, the donors would face substantial unpredictability of funds
needed for each period. This could undermine their ability to plan and allocate
resources, and hence, probably, their willingness to support this scheme. How-
ever, by participating in the initiative and promoting and rewarding growth, it
is most likely that donors be less frequently asked to provide debt relief, through
contributions to IDA, to countries in debt distress, which are usually those who
fail to achieve sustainable growth.
If in reality donors are not able to carry the full burden of this arrange-
ment, a combination of donor commitments and adjustments in IDA’s financing
terms, for example through an increase in the interest rate or fees (in this way,
the member countries will be paying insurance premium), may form a possible
alternative.
4.5 Conditions for qualifying
Under the proposed scheme IDA will be providing debt relief to its troubled
members. However, there should be conditions to qualify for this scheme through
a pre-qualification procedure, as certain standards for policy performance should
be maintained in order to ensure that the risks to achieving and maintaining
the scheme’s objectives are minimized. The lack of symmetry for borrowers,
i.e. reduced debt service in bad times would not be matched by increased debt
service in good times, further strengthens the case for conditionality.
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It seems reasonable, in terms of eligibility, to extend the existing procedures,
i.e. the HIPC process, and/or blend them with modified conditions specifically
tailored to ensure the effectiveness of the new scheme. The design of the HIPC
initiative embodies lessons of experience in setting the eligibility criteria, and
most notably, linking conditionality with ownership, through the PRSP process
for example (see World Bank OED, 2003). The extension of the existing proce-
dures is desirable as it will be building upon existing experience and expertise,
and would not impose considerable costs in adjustments for both the poor coun-
tries and for operational procedures1.
In the suggested modification of the conditionalities I draw mainly on the
lessons learned from past experiences and recommendations of the OED report
(2003) for 1) maintaining the standards for policy performance, and 2) greater
focus on pro-poor growth as compared to social conditionality.
A specific conditionality that would complement the existing procedure would
be meeting standards for GDP data reporting. This, given the weak statistical
capacity in the poorest countries (see for example IMF, 2004 and Borensztein,
2004), would require extra financing and technical assistance. Further, countries
would have to re-qualify every few years to ensure that the risks involved for
IDA and the donors are minimized.
1The HIPC Initiative is open to all countries that are (i) eligible for PRGF and International
Development Association (IDA)-only funding; (ii) pursue or adopt IMF- and IDA-supported
adjustment programs, and (iii) have an unsustainable debt burden after full use of traditional
debt relief mechanisms. Eligibility Requirement: IDA only and PRGF Eligible.
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5 Financial structure
Consider a country whose main source of financing is IDA. An IDA loan, of
$A, carries a fixed interest rate of 0.75% and typically has 40 years maturity.
Currently the debt service shows little variation over time. The scheduled re-
payments, fixed under the current arrangement, are S1, S2. . .St:
St =

0 if 0 < t < 10,
0.02A if 10 < t < 20,
0.04A if 20 < t < 40.
(1)
I consider schemes, which substitute this fixed repayment structure with
revised payments S∗1, S∗2. . .S∗t. Each scheme I consider has a swap and a
swaption variant.
5.1 Swaps
Floating-for-fixed interest rate swaps are the most widely traded interest rate
derivative instruments. The swap proposal here extends this principle from
interest rates to GDP growth. A country’s asset structure is floating: it is
exposed to volatile revenues and exports, which as separate components or in
combination contribute to volatile national income in terms of GDP volatility.
Their liability structure, however, is independent of the national income level or
its movements. Under the swap scheme the IDA borrowing countries will benefit
by swapping their fixed exposure (fixed scheduled debt service repayments) for
a floating rate exposure (the GDP growth rate). The revised repayments would
be higher than on the corresponding conventional loan when GDP growth is
high and lower when low.
Assume a country’s real GDP growth for many years has been g, and the
realized 4-year moving average GDP growth for year t is gt. A fraction λ ≥ 0
of the original loan is swapped into the floating loan:
S∗t = λSt + (1− λ)St (2)
Let’s take a look at the swapped fraction of the debt service λ St. Its
amount will depend on the changes in GDP growth rate, I call it coefficient of
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dependence c, so that the complete formula becomes:
S∗t = λcSt + (1− λ)St (3)
c = 1 + (gt − g) (4)
When the moving average of growth for a particular year is the same as the
GDP growth trend, then c = 1 and the debt service will stay unchanged. When
the growth is higher than the trend, c > 1, the revised repayments would be
higher than on the corresponding conventional loan and adversely, lower when
the growth falls short of the trend, c < 1.
After simplifying through substitution
S∗t = λcSt + (1− λ)St = λ[1 + (gt − g)]St + (1− λ)St = [1 + λ(gt − g)]St (5)
the general formula can be summarized as follows:
S∗t =
[1 + λ (gt - g)] St if c 6= 1,St if c = 1. (6)
When GDP growth turns out higher than usual, the repayment would be
higher than under the conventional repayment schedule, of which the country
would only repay the original sum of debt service due and the difference would be
paid by the New Trust Fund, as described above. From the borrowing country’s
point of view the repayments in the case of indexation will be:
S∗t =

[1 + λ (gt - g)] St if gt < g,
St if gt = g,
St if gt > g.
(7)
The difference between S∗t and St is the amount of debt relief the country
would receive when it experiences an economic slowdown and will be paid to
IDA by the New Trust Fund. From the New Trust Fund’s point of view the
payments to IDA in the case of indexation will be:
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S∗t =

0 if gt < g,
0 if gt = g,
[1 + λ (gt – g)] St - St = λ (gt – g) St if gt > g.
(8)
IDA will run a down-side risk. Its loss will be to the amount of foregone
repayments in the events of slow economic growth:
IDA loss =

St – [1 + λ (gt – g)] St if gt < g,
0 if gt = g,
0 if gt > g.
(9)
A positive minimum payment and a maximum (1.5 times the original due)
payment should be introduced, so that when g > gt debt service can be expressed
as:
S∗t = min {max[St + λ(gt − g)St; 0]; 1.5St} (10)
5.2 Swaptions
A swaption is a variant of the swap structure described above and its aim is to
cope only with exceptional movements in the GDP. A swaption is an over-the-
counter option to enter into a swap. In exchange for an option premium, the
purchaser gains the right (but not the obligation) to enter into a specified swap
agreement with the issuer on a specified future date. With the swaption variant
the scheme will come into effect only in the case of exceptional GDP growth
volatility, it will not be used to cope with normal GDP movements. In the
band in which the GDP growth rate is within ±κ% of the benchmark growth
rate, debt repayments are unchanged from those under the standard currency
loan, in other words they will be unaffected for moderate variations in the GDP
growth. Repayments under this scheme, using the same principles as under the
swap structure, will be:
S∗t =

{1 + λ[gt - (1+κ)g]}St if (1+κ)g < gt,
St if (1-κ)g ≤ gt ≤ (1+κ)g,
{1 - λ[(1-κ)g – gt]}St if gt < (1-κ)g.
(11)
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In the simulations I set κ =10% of the GDP growth trend.
The careful determination of (i) the threshold to which relief is triggered, i.e.
the trend g, (ii) the instruments of the scheme, and (iii) the extent of the relief,
i.e. the insurance coefficient or hedge ratio λ is crucial for providing enough
benefits to the borrowing countries and at the same time maintaining the sus-
tainability of IDA resources.
All schemes are presented under the cap-floor approach, which sets a mini-
mum positive floor and cap of 1.5 times the original debt service to ensure that
modified debt service does not depart too much from the original levels.
5.3 Hedge ratio
The structures I consider in this paper swap out $λA of the conventional loan
into a floating-for-fixed swap in terms of the economic growth of an IDA bor-
rowing country. The parameter λ determines the degree of insurance of the
instrument. Finding the appropriate values for the hedge parameter λ deter-
mine how large the swap position should be in relation to the country’s debt
service on IDA loans.
Traditionally, the hedge ratios can be derived in two ways:
• analytically, using analytical formulas for the variance minimizing hedge,
which takes into account the covariance structure of the variables(Ederington,
1979; Anderson and Danthine, 1980), and
• empirically, using regressions or applying a grid search approach.
Under both techniques, the optimal hedge ratio is time-invariant and is cal-
culated using historical data. However, if the standard deviations are changing
over time, the use of a single value for the hedge ratio influences the results
of such techniques (Allen et al, 2001)2. A recent and very popular direction
has been to relax the constant minimum variance hedge ratio assumption, and
use a more sophisticated technique that allows for time variation. This involves
estimating the time-varying hedge ratio using conditional volatility estimates
2If the hedge ratio differs by contract, the movement from one contract to the next is likely
to lead to instability in the estimated regression coefficients. Tests for parameter instability
in the estimated regression suggest that this is indeed the case and our conclusion is that it is
preferable to consider the estimation of the hedge ratio in a panel setting with each individual
contract considered as a panel of data.
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from a multivariate GARCH model (Brooks, 2004).3 Most recently “dynamic”
hedging approaches have been suggested by Lence, Kimle and Hayenga (1993)
and Myers and Hanson (1996) (see Allen et al, 2001). However, I do not pursue
that direction in the paper.
5.3.1 Hedge ratio in the simulations
In what follows I use the empirical approach to calculate country specific hedge
ratios. An advantage of the empirical approach is that it can be applied to calcu-
late hedge ratios for different minimization objectives where exact formulas are
unavailable. The hedge ratios, λ, can be determined empirically by regressions
of the variable whose variance we wish to minimize on the hedge instrument or
by grid search for the minimizing value for λ.
I look at the variance of two ratios:
• debt service-to-GDP ratio S/Y ; and
• residual forex-to-GDP ratio (X −O − S)/Y.
The debt sustainability literature has typically focused on the debt-service-
to-GDP ratio. This measure has the merit of direct comparability across coun-
tries (see for example World Bank and IMF, 2001, and Edwards, 2001 and
2003). A variant of this measure is the residual forex-to-GDP ratio. The ratio
measures the free foreign exchange resources that a country has available after
meeting its debt obligations. This gives a more immediate measure of the impact
of debt service payments. Export revenues (X), as the main source of foreign
exchange, finance the country’s external debt obligations, which in the case of
the low income countries are set in the currency of the lender or in SDR in the
case of IDA. I also include oil import expenditures (O), as countries importing
petroleum may experience difficulties in meeting scheduled loan repayments in
periods when oil prices are high.
3ARCH and GARCH models (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986) have been used to esti-
mate time-varying hedge ratios. The time-varying joint distribution of cash and future price
changes has been examined for hedging financial instruments (Cecchetti et al, 1988). Bivari-
ate GARCH (BGARCH) models also have been used to estimate time-varying hedge ratios
in commodity futures (Baillie et al, 1991; Myers, 1991), in foreign exchange futures (Kroner
et al, 1990), in interest rate futures (Gagnon et al, 1995), and in stock index futures (Park
et al, 1995 and Tong 1996). These more recent studies suggest that conventional hedging
procedures can produce misleading results.
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The low correlation between the variables and the complicated relationship
between the variance in growth rates and the levels of GDP lead to poor and
statistically insignificant results and show that the regression approach is not
the best suited approach for finding the hedge ratio for this particular scheme.
Currently GDP growth is not highly correlated with debt service, and the ob-
jective of the new scheme is to increase that correlation. The poor regression
results show that there is scope for such an arrangement but do not, however,
show what the proportionality factor should be. Hence, I apply the grid search
to find minimizing hedge for both the debt-service-to-GDP ratio and the free
forex-to-GDP ratio.
I minimize the variance of the debt service-to-GDP ratio with the hedge
ratio λ as follows:
min
(
V ar
(
S∗t
Yt
− S
∗
t
Yt
))
(12)
I take a range of values and look for the minimizing value for λ1.
Similarly, I minimize the variability of the free foreign exchange relative to
the country’s GDP as follows:
min
(
V ar
(
X −O − S∗t
Yt
−
(
X −O − S∗t
Yt
)))
(13)
Here again I take a range of values and look for the minimizing value for λ2.
The two different hedge ratios, λ1and λ2, for the two minimization objectives
are applied to the respective schemes.
I now have a matrix of the structure possibilities for the schemes:
Contract type swap swaption
Minimization ratio Hedge
ratio
S/Y λ1 Scheme B Scheme BB
(X −O − S)/Y λ2 Scheme A Scheme AA
Table 1: Structure possibilities for the schemes.
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6 Simulations and simulation results
I perform historical simulations over the period 1984-2001 for schemes of the
form outlined above using a set of seven highly indebted African countries:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi and Rwanda.
These countries are IDA borrowing countries, for which service on IDA loans is
a sufficiently large proportion of total debt service to allow the scheme to have
a significant impact on overall debt service.4
6.1 Summary results
Detailed simulation results are presented in Table 6 and 7 in Appendix A. Ta-
ble 6 takes as objective the minimization of the variance of country’s residual
foreign exchange relative to its GDP whereas Table 7 is based on the mini-
mization of the IDA debt-service-to-GDP ratio. For each country and hedging
scheme results are provided for each of the swap-based and swaption scheme
using a ±10% threshold.
In the previous section I specified two objectives:
• minimization of the variance of IDA debt-service-to-GDP ratio, S/Y ; and
• minimization of the variance of the residual foreign exchange-to-GDP ra-
tio, (X −O − S)/Y .
Table 2 reports the results of the simulations per country in terms of these
objectives. The schemes that are based on the variance reduction of the second
objective, scheme A and AA, are the best performing schemes. Under these
two schemes the variability of the free forex relative to the country’s GDP is
reduced by an average of 3.4% and 3.7%, respectively. The schemes based
on the first objective, generally fail to deliver the needed results in terms of
variance minimization, the only exceptions being Ghana and Malawi. This can
largely be explained by the fact that the actual volatility of the residual foreign
exchange-to-GDP ratio, measured as the standard deviation of the ratio about
4Source of data: World Bank - World Development Indicators and Global Development
Finance database 2003; HIPC countries’ completion point documents (2000-2004); HIPC Ini-
tiative Status of Implementation reports (2000-2004); and IDA data on actual debt repayments
to IDA.
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its moving average trend, is considerably larger than in the case of IDA debt-
service-to-GDP ratio and, hence, has the potential to be considerably reduced
under these schemes (see Appendix A for the actual and simulated volatility of
the two ratios per country).
swap swaption
(x−o−s)/y s/y (x−o−s)/y s/y
A B AA BB
Benin 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Burkina Faso 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Cameroon 5.8% 0.0% 6.0% 0.0%
Ghana 2.1% 6.7% 2.6% 0.0%
Madagascar 10.0% 0.0% 12.6% 0.0%
Malawi 3.7% 6.7% 2.5% 5.9%
Rwanda 1.9% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0%
Average 3.4% 1.9% 3.7% 0.8%
Median 2.1% 0.0% 2.5% 0.0%
Table 2: Variance reduction per country for the period 1987-2001.
The results differ markedly between the swap and swaption scheme. The
swaption schemes perform worse than the swap schemes. The variance mini-
mizing hedge weights are estimated using a linear approach, discussed in the
previous chapter. The nonlinearities associated with the swaption scheme imply
that a linear approach would not deliver a full optimization of the scheme.
Table 3 reports the results per country for each of the schemes in terms of
eased debt service payments. Table 4 gives the summary results of the sim-
ulations. All the schemes deliver debt relief for the IDA borrowing countries.
When experiencing economic slowdown the countries are exempt, partially or
fully depending on the severity of the economic slowdown, of debt service on
IDA loans.
The results differ markedly across countries but are fairly consistent across
alternative schemes. Schemes A and AA are again the best performers. The
schemes based on the minimization of debt service-to-GDP variance, B and
BB, as mentioned above, are not fully optimized in terms of variance reduction
and have the potential to increase this variance. Hence, considering both the
minimization objectives and the potential benefits for the countries, it can be
concluded that the schemes that take into account the residual foreign exchange
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(x− o− s)/y s/y
A AA B BB
Benin 15.4% 14.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Burkina Faso 7.8% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Cameroon 35.5% 35.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Ghana 5.4% 0.9% 10.5% 1.3%
Madagascar 38.2% 29.9% 0.7% 0.6%
Malawi 25.2% 20.6% 2.0% 1.6%
Rwanda 35.5% 34.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 3: Reduction in IDA debt service for 1984-2001 (in %).
have superiority above schemes based on the objective of debt-service-to GDP
variance minimization. The swap scheme A provides larger benefits for the
recipient countries than the swaption scheme AA. It should be acknowledged,
however, that the swaption estimates depend on the choice of a particular band-
width parameter, which I take here as ±10%. Other choices may give different
results.
Scheme Debt service reduction
% $m
Average (x− o− s)/y
A swap 23% 40.9
AA swaption 20% 32.9
s/y
B swap 2% 6.9
BB swaption 1% 1.6
Median (x− o− s)/y
A swap 25% 40.3
AA swaption 21% 39.0
s/y
B swap 0% 0.1
BB swaption 0% 0.1
Table 4: Simulation summary statistics (1987-2001).
Below I present in detail the results under the swap and swaption scheme
based on the variance minimization objective for free forex relative to GDP for
two of the countries for which I have conducted the simulations: the country for
which the schemes perform least well: Benin; and the country for which they
perform the best: Madagascar.
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6.2 Benin
IDA is Benin’s major concessional lender. The country’s economy is heavily de-
pendent on highly variable cotton export revenues and oil import expenditures.
Cotton accounted for an average 35% of total export revenues over the simu-
lated period, while oil imports averaged 16% of total export revenues over the
same period. While export revenues and oil import expenditures have shown
considerable variation over time, debt service payments to IDA show relatively
little cyclical variation. Figure 1 graphs Benin’s revenues, expenditures and
debt repayments for the period 1984-2001.
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Figure 1: Benin – Total export revenues and oil import expenditures. Values in
millions of US dollars.
In terms of meeting the prime objective of the new arrangement, i.e. mini-
mization of the variance of the residual foreign exchange relative to GDP, Benin
gives the poorest results of the seven countries in my sample. The swap scheme
A provides a reduction of this variance of only 0.3%, whereas the swaption
scheme AA fails to contribute to such a reduction.
Despite the poor performance of the variance of this ratio, Benin could have
contributed from the new arrangement, as it would have received a total of
around US$15 million nominal debt relief over the period, representing 15%
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Figure 2: Benin – Total debt service due to IDA. Values in millions of US dollars.
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Figure 3: Benin’s obligations to IDA. Values in millions of US dollars.
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of reduction in total IDA repayments in nominal terms. This small impact
can be explained mainly by the fact that growth has accelerated over the last
decade. When compared with the HIPC assistance that the country has received
since 2000, the total reduction in debt service under the new arrangement is
relatively small. Benin has started receiving debt relief under the Enhanced
HIPC Initiative in 2000 and so far IDA has delivered US$27.1 million in debt
service reduction. The total IDA assistance amounts to US$124.3 million in
nominal terms and is being delivered through 50% reduction in debt service
over the period 2000-2014(World Bank and IMF, 2003 and 2004).
Figure 2 presents the actual debt service paid and simulated total debt ser-
vice due to IDA under the new arrangement for the swap and swaption schemes.
Consistent with the formulation of the scheme, repayments to IDA would have
increased in periods of good economic performance, and decreased when Benin
was experiencing economic slowdown. However, as outlined in the structure of
the proposal, when GDP growth turns out higher than usual Benin would only
repay the original sum of debt service due and the difference would be paid by
the New Trust Fund. Figure 3 shows the debt service that Benin would have
actually had to pay to IDA.
6.3 Madagascar
Madagascar is the country for which the proposed arrangement would have per-
formed best both in terms of meeting the objective of variance minimization and
of delivering sufficient benefits in terms of easing the IDA debt repayments. The
swap scheme A reduces the variance of the country’s residual foreign exchange-
to-GDP ratio by 10%, which the swaption scheme AA reduces it by 12.6%. Fig-
ure 4 and 5 show the total debt service due to IDA and Madagascar’s obligation
respectively. Over the simulated period Madagascar would have seen a nominal
debt service reduction of 38% under the swap scheme and 30% under the swap-
tion scheme, representing US$94 million and US$74 million reduction in value
terms for the two schemes. An interesting comparison is between the results un-
der the new arrangement and the IDA debt relief that Madagascar has received
under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. Madagascar is a HIPC country that has
started receiving debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative in 2001. Debt
relief from IDA approved at the decision point amounted to US$436.7 million in
nominal terms and this assistance is being delivered through a 50% reduction
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in debt service to IDA over the period 2001-2020. So far, for 2001-2004, IDA
has delivered US$59.6 million (World Bank, 2004).
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Figure 4: Madagascar – Total debt service due to IDA. Values in millions of US
dollars.
6.4 Simulated impact on IDA
We have seen that from the borrower’s point of view the proposed schemes have
potential benefits. The schemes, however, have costs, the principal cost being
the unsmoothing of flows from the borrowing countries to IDA. The impact is
charted in Figure 6.4, which looks at the swap and swaption schemes based
on the objective of minimization of the free foreign exchange-to-GDP ratio:
schemes A and AA. The figure compares the total debt repayments to IDA from
the seven countries in my simulation sample with actual historical repayments
over the simulated period 1984-2001. 5
5It should be noted that the current results on the IDA impact are based on a sample
of seven countries, so they are not indicative of the potential impact on IDA with a bigger
set of countries actually participating in the arrangement. In order to simulate IDA’s overall
impact, simulations can be based on sub-samples of possible beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
or, alternatively, a random sample of IDA borrowers. I do not pursue that direction here.
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Figure 5: Madagascar – Madagascar’s total obligation to IDA. Values in millions
of US dollars.
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There is no significant contrast between the impact of the swap and swaption
scheme. Both schemes generate relatively large departures of debt repayments
from their historical time path. The maximum negative divergence of scheme
A is US$49.9 million and of scheme AA US$45.5 million in 1994, while the
maximum positive divergence is US$50.3 million in 1998 for scheme A, and
US$32.8 million in 2000 for scheme AA. One reason for this divergence is the
relatively little offsetting due to the high correlation of growth rates in the
seven countries. Despite this, there is significant offsetting between the periods
of positive and negative economic growth. The consequence is that simulated
flows average 95% of the actual historical flows in the swap scheme and 93% in
the swaption scheme.
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Figure 6: Historical and simulated IDA repayments. Values in millions of US
dollars.
The schemes were designed so that the New Trust Fund would bear the
upside risk and IDA – the downside risk of the new arrangement. Table 5
summarizes the costs of the schemes for the Trust Fund and IDA and compares
them with the debt relief that has already been delivered to the seven countries
in the simulation sample over the period 2000-2004 (see Appendix A Table 8
for detailed results per country). The summary results show that on average
27
the reduced repayments flow to IDA is offset by the contributions of the Trust
Fund. For the period 1984-2001 IDA would have accumulated a net loss of
only US$26 million in the swap scheme, while under the swaption arrangement
it would have even generated a net profit of US$12.6 million. An interesting
comparison is between the cost occurred by the New Trust Fund and the IDA
HIPC assistance that has already been delivered to the seven countries under
the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. In both the swap and swaption arrangement the
cost to the New Trust Fund over a period of 18 years (1984-2001) is less than
the IDA assistance provided to these countries over only 5 years (2000-2004).
These results indicate that there would be no significant disruptions to IDA
finances. Figure 7 compares the obligations of borrowing countries and the New
Trust Fund to IDA with the historical repayments to the institution.
New Trust Fund IDA loss IDA net IDA HIPC assis-
tance (2000-2004)
Scheme A 312.6 286.5 26.1 390.1
Scheme AA 217.6 230.2 -12.6 390.1
Table 5: Net impact on IDA.
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Figure 7: Actual and simulated borrowers’ obligation and Trust Fund payments.
Values in millions of US dollars.
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7 Conclusion
In the present financial architecture low income countries financing, which is
predominantly concessional, takes exclusively the form of non-contingent debt.
While recent research has made a strong case for indexing debt to GDP in
emerging markets, in this paper I have asked the question of whether this ap-
proach is feasible and desirable for IDA member countries. I show that flexibility
of these countries in meeting their concessional debt service obligations can be
achieved by augmenting the existing debt agreements by a set of GDP growth
swaps and swaptions. This innovation is both applicable and desirable. It can
be achieved by adjusting the value of debt to the repayment capacity through
the provision of relief to compensate for low growth in IDA borrowing coun-
tries. This is consistent with the general incentives for IDA to promote growth
by providing resources to countries that are likely to perform.
The results differ markedly across countries but are fairly consistent across
alternative schemes. Considering both the minimization objectives and the po-
tential benefits for the countries, it can be concluded that the schemes that
take into account the residual foreign exchange have the potential to be highly
effective. Further, the simulations show that there would be no significant dis-
ruptions to IDA finances. Because of the significant offsetting between periods
of positive and negative economic growth the simulated flows average roughly
95% of the actual historical flows.
We have seen that the benefits of this innovative GDP-linked debt arrange-
ment can be significant for the IDA borrowing countries without being too
costly for IDA and the donors. While there are difficulties with any financial
innovation, an international effort coordinated by the IFIs, can offer a means of
mitigating these difficulties. As part of the international effort, the World Bank
can set the standards by introducing this innovative instrument in own house
by linking debt service to IDA, the World Bank’s concessional window, to the
member countries’ economic performance.
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A Simulation results
Actual Simulated
DS reduction
Standard
deviation
Scheme Standard
deviation
% $m
Benin 1.89% A swap 1.89% 15.4% 15.66
AA swaption 1.90% 14.1% 14.35
Burkina Faso 1.50% A swap 1.49% 7.8% 8.77
AA swaption 1.50% 4.0% 4.52
Cameroon 3.94% A swap 3.72% 35.5% 43.49
AA swaption 3.71% 35.5% 43.49
Ghana 3.60% A swap 3.52% 5.4% 21.49
AA swaption 3.51% 0.9% 3.76
Madagascar 2.38% A swap 2.14% 38.2% 93.85
AA swaption 2.08% 29.9% 73.62
Malawi 3.00% A swap 2.89% 25.2% 62.84
AA swaption 2.92% 20.6% 51.45
Rwanda 1.52% A swap 1.49% 35.5% 40.34
AA swaption 1.49% 34.3% 39.00
Average 2.55% A swap 2.45% 23.3% 40.92
AA swaption 2.44% 19.9% 32.89
Median 2.38% A swap 2.14% 25.2% 40.34
AA swaption 2.08% 20.6% 39.00
The standard deviation measures the standard deviation (about its moving average
trend) of the difference between export revenues and the sum of oil import expenditures
and IDA debt service payments relative to the country’s GDP. Debt service reduction
measures the nominal debt relief under the simulated schemes for the period 1984-2001.
Table 6: Simulation summary statistics (1984-2001). Schemes based on
(X −O − S)/Y minimization objective.
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Actual Simulated
DS reduction
Standard
deviation
Scheme Standard
deviation
% $m
Benin 0.03% B swap 0.03% 0.1% 0.11
BB swaption 0.03% 0.1% 0.09
Burkina Faso 0.03% B swap 0.03% 0.0% 0.02
BB swaption 0.03% 0.0% 0.01
Cameroon 0.01% B swap 0.01% 0.0% 0.00
BB swaption 0.01% 0.0% 0.00
Ghana 0.11% B swap 0.11% 10.5% 41.55
BB swaption 0.12% 1.3% 5.28
Madagascar 0.04% B swap 0.04% 0.7% 1.84
BB swaption 0.04% 0.6% 1.54
Malawi 0.18% B swap 0.17% 2.0% 5.01
BB swaption 0.17% 1.6% 4.04
Rwanda 0.06% B swap 0.06% 0.0% 0.00
BB swaption 0.06% 0.0% 0.00
Average 0.07% B swap 0.06% 1.91% 6.93
BB swaption 0.07% 0.53% 1.57
Median 0.04% B swap 0.04% 0.11% 0.11
BB swaption 0.04% 0.08% 0.09
The standard deviation measures the standard deviation (about its moving average
trend) of the difference between export revenues and the sum of oil import expen-
ditures and IDA debt service payments relative to the country’s GDP. Debt service
reduction measures the nominal debt relief under the simulated schemes for the
period 1984-2001.
Table 7: Simulation summary statistics (1984-2001). Schemes based on S/Y
minimization objective.
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Scheme A Scheme AA HIPC debt
relief
New
Trust
Fund
IDA loss IDA net New
Trust
Fund
IDA loss IDA net IDA assistance
delivered 2000-
2004
Benin 37.4 15.7 21.7 29.7 14.3 15.3 27.1
Burkina
Faso
14.1 8.8 5.4 7.1 4.5 2.6 29.0
Cameroon 39.5 43.5 -4.0 39.5 43.5 -4.0 63.9
Ghana 75.3 21.5 53.8 11.1 3.8 7.3 99.9
Madagascar 74.4 93.9 -19.5 71.2 73.6 -2.5 54.9
Malawi 48.6 62.8 -14.3 36.0 51.4 -15.5 67.2
Rwanda 23.3 40.3 -17.0 23.0 39.0 -16.0 48.1
Total 312.6 286.5 26.1 217.6 230.2 -12.6 390.1
Table 8: Cost to the New Trust Fund and net IDA impact.
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B Previous experiences with GDP-linked bonds
B.1 External debt
Bulgaria:
The Bulgarian experience presents an interesting case in the discussion of
GDP-linked debt, and more specifically of the design and specifications of the
agreement (the methodology of the GDP calculations).
In 1994 Bulgaria issued $5.16 billion debt in three types of Brady bonds (in-
terest arrears bonds (IABs), front-loaded interest reduction bonds (FLIRBs),
and discount bonds (DISCs) as part of a debt restructuring agreement with its
commercial creditors of the London Club. The discount bonds are callable and
contain an element of indexation to GDP, defined in the Additional Interest
Payments (AIP) clause. Under the AIP the bondholders are entitled to a sup-
plemental interest payment for each year in which Bulgaria’s GDP surpasses
125% of its 1993 level provided there is a year-to-year increase in GDP. So only
the coupon payments are indexed to the economic performance. For these years
there would be a semi-annual interest supplement, coinciding with the regular
interest payment dates, and defined as one-half of that year’s GDP growth.
coupon = base+ premium (14)
premiumt =
0 if GDPt < 125%*GDP1993,0.5∗GDPt−GDP(t−1)
GDP(t−1)
if GDPt > 125%*GDP1993.
(15)
The warrant is inseparable from the bond. Though straightforward and
simple on first sight, there appeared to be a lot of vagueness to the exact way
of calculating GDP growth, making the clause open to interpretation.
The problem was that GDP was not well defined. Although the original
documentation defined GDP as the figure associated with the publication of
the World Table (succeeded by the World Development Indicators (WDI) of
the World Bank, it did not specify which exact series of GDP should be taken
into account. The World Bank publishes four series of GDP: in USD and local
currency units in both constant and current prices. The choice of GDP measure
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is critical to the determination of whether additional interest is payable, as the
four different series present four different scenarios with quite different outcomes
(Bear Stearns March 25, 2004, see Box 6 on page 35). It can be argued that the
appropriate GDP is the constant US dollar or constant local terms indicator,
which takes inflation into account and reflects economic growth in real terms.
Box 6: Scenario’s Bulgaria
Scenario 1: U.S. dollar GDP at current prices
For example, in the case of the U.S. dollar, current price series, the GDP trigger
is breached in 2001, and additional interest would be payable in 2003. On the
stock of US$679 million, this would suggest US$51 million in interest arrears
outstanding.
Scenario 2: GDP in leva at current prices
Under this scenario, the GDP threshold was breached in 1994. The interest
arrears would be a massive US$228 million, excluding the interest on interest
also due.
Scenario 3: GDP in constant leva prices
The GDP threshold is crossed in 2005, leaving the MOF with time to call the
bonds, on any of the call dates between 2004 and 2006. No additional interest
liability would then be due.
Scenario 4: GDP in constant U.S. dollars (deflated by U.S. CPI)
The GDP threshold is crossed in 2003, leaving the MOF with time to call the
bonds on any of the call dates in 2004. No additional interest liability would
then be due.
Source: Bear Stearns
As the bonds were callable, it was widely expected that Bulgaria will buy
them back and refinance with cheaper debt. Bulgaria’s rapid economic growth
since 1998 was an indication that the country is approaching the point when ad-
ditional interest payments will be triggered, making the service of the discount
bonds too expensive. Bulgaria began to refinance its Brady bonds through
cheaper Eurobonds and in July 2004 the government exercised its option to re-
deem its discount bonds and repaid all discount bonds 20 years before maturity.
The external debt buyback reduces the external debt-to-GDP ratio, a significant
and robust predictor of external debt problems, increasing the creditworthiness
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of the country. Upon announcement of the operation, the Fitch and Standard
& Poor’s assigned an investment grade to Bulgaria, raising the country’s foreign
currency rating from BB+ to BBB-.
Bosnia and Herzegovina:
In December 1998, Bosnia and Herzegovina finalized a debt rescheduling
agreement with the London Club. The London Club forgave some 73 percent of
the debt on a present discounted value basis. The remaining US$ 400 millions
was reissued as Brady bonds, which had two components: a “basic amount”
of some US$147.8 million and a “performance amount” for the rest. The basic
amount was rescheduled over 20 years with a seven-year grace period. The
performance amount would fall due once and if Bosnia and Herzegovina GDP
per capita reaches US$2,800 (measured at 1997 prices) for two consecutive years
before 2018, the maturity date of the bonds. In other words, once the GDP
trigger is breached, the bondholders are entitled to receive a new bond, called
new performance bond that would pay LIBOR + 13/16 in 24 equal installments
with the bonds amortizing in 24 equal installments. Here, both principal, in the
face of a new bond, and interest payments, on this new bond, are actually
indexed to the growth in GDP.
The trigger here is GDP per capita. Both series of data included in the
benchmark calculation, GDP levels and population, are subject to continuous
revisions, as the country is struggling to improve its official data reporting.
This, however, increases the uncertainty of the timing the warrant will be trig-
gered. The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina has recently revised the
data on the country’s GDP including the large informal sector, estimating that
the nonobserved economy accounts for more than 37 percent of total economic
activity. It has yet to be seen whether the IFIs will take the Central Bank re-
visions into account. There have also been uncertainties about the population
data.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has grown steadily after the war and if it continues
to do so, it is most likely that it will be able to generate sufficient resources to
buyback the indexed bonds before they become too expensive to service.
Argentina:
In December 2001 the government suspended principal and interest pay-
ments on Argentina’s public external debt. Alternatives for debt restructuring
have been discussed ever since and in June 2004, Argentina announced its final
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proposal, which includes a GDP indexation element (US SEC, 2004).
Three new types of debt securities will be issued together with a detachable
GDP-linked unit. The initial government proposals, announced at the annual
IMF-World Bank meeting in Dubai in 2003, linked interest payments to GDP
growth, while the latest plans are to index the principal payments, entitling
bondholders to annual payments contingent upon Argentina’s achievement of
levels of gross domestic product in excess of pre-determined levels (Latin Amer-
ican Weekly Spotlight, 2004). Payment amount will be 5% of the difference
between actual GDP and base case GDP in local currency units, with base case
GDP the projected real GDP at an annual growth rate of 3%. Payments are
triggered when actual real GDP as of the reference date exceeds the base case
GDP, and the annual growth rate exceeds 3% (US SEC, 2004). This means
that an additional payment will be made when the economy grows above a
certain level. This coupon linked to GDP growth will mature in 30 years and
will be payable in December of each year. In order to define the time and the
amount of the payment, a base scenario is envisaged with annual growth of 3%
as of the end of 2004. When GDP in a given year exceeds the level marked
out by the previous calculation and records simultaneous expansion of over 3%
annually, the payment of the additional coupon is triggered. This payment is
calculated as 5% of the difference between current GDP and the GDP of the
base scenario, measured in current values, and is expressed in the currency of
the corresponding bond according to the market exchange rate6.
annualpayment =

0 if GDPt < 1.03*GDPt−1
and/or gt < 3%,
0.05*(GDPt-1.03*GDPt−1) if GDPt > 1.03*GDPt−1
and gt > 3%.
(16)
The GDP-linked unit will be detachable from the plain vanilla bond, unlike
the inseparable warrants in the case of Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and will be traded if a market for the stripped coupon develops.
6http://www.consargtoro.ca/economicjun2004.htm
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B.2 Domestic debt
Singapore:
The Singapore government has issued two types of GDP-indexed shares, New
Singapore Shares (NSS) and Economic Restructuring Shares (ERS). The NSS
were introduced in 2001 to help the lower income group tide over the economic
downturn. The ERS were introduced in 2003 as part of the offset package meant
to help Singaporeans adapt to the structural changes in the economy, especially
the increase in the goods and services tax rate. Both types of shares earn annual
dividends, in the form of bonus shares. The bonus shares are calculated at a
rate of 3% plus the real GDP growth rate of the preceding calendar year, with
a guarantee of at least 3%.7
B.3 Corporate debt
Michelin:
A GDP linkage has found its place in corporate risk financing, setting new
grounds for corporate thinking on risk management.
Compagnie Financie`re Michelin (CFM), the financial and holding arm of the
Michelin tyre group, was granted combined bank and insurance capital facility,
co-arranged by Swiss Re New Markets (SRNM) and Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale (SG).
Under the terms of the joint SG/SRNM transaction, CFM has guaranteed
access to a bank credit facility and the option to draw under certain conditions
on an insurance facility. The trigger event for the latter is a fall in the combined
average annual GDP growth rate in Michelin’s main markets – the euro zone and
the US – below a certain level. This level is set at 1.5% in the first three years
and 2% in the last two years of the five-year option. The insurance trigger arises
from the fact that Michelin’s revenues are highly correlated to GDP growth in
these markets. This guarantees the necessary resources to weather any crisis,
as well as to make an acquisition without equity increases .8
7Source: http://www.nss.gov.sg
8Source: www.financewise.com/public/edit/riskm/art/art-profile.htm
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